

Message Text

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ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00 CPR-02 AID-20 PRS-01

L-03 OMB-01 TRSE-00 IGA-02 DRC-01 /127 W

----- 069216

R 221415Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6392

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BRIDGETOWN 1607

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR GJ

SUBJ: GRENADIAN INDEPENDENCE

REFS: (A) BRIDGETOWN 1426 (B) BRIDGETOWN 1425

(C) STATE 217552

FROM AMBASSADOR

SUMMARY

THIS TELEGRAM IS IN REPLY TO STATE 217552 WHICH WAS IN REPLY TO MY 1426 (REFTEL A) ENTITLED "SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS BEARING ON GRENADA'S INDEPENDENCE," AND 1425 (REFTEL B) CONCERNING PREMIER GAIRY'S SPECIFIC INDEPENDENCE REQUESTS TO THE U.S. I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE THOUGHT AND ATTENTION DISPLAYED BY THE DEPARTMENT IN ITS REPLY (REFTEL C) WHICH COVERED BOTH POLICY (1426) AND PROCEDURE (1425). ON NOVEMBER 13 AND 15 I ASKED THE SOLE POLITICAL OFFICER AND THE SOLE ECONOMIC OFFICER FROM THIS EMBASSY TO VISIT GRENADA AND TO HAND PERSONALLY TO GAIRY A LETTER FROM ME CONTAINING THE SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL C DEALING WITH ASSISTANCE, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION, AND THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION. THAT LETTER

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WAS READ ALOUD BY GAIRY TO HIS ENTIRE CABINET. THIS TELEGRAM

CONTAINS: (A) SOME FURTHER ADUMBRATION ON THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL A, (B) GAIRY'S REACTION TO MY LETTER, AND (C) CURRENT VIEWS OF THE EMBASSY RE GRENADA FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF THE VISITING EMBOFFS.

1. CONCERNING POLICY:

(A) IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND DEPARTMENT'S RELUCTANCE (PARA 2, REFTEL C) TO ACCEPT UK DECISION TO LEAVE GRENADA "ON OUR DOORSTEP AS NONVIALE AND POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME INDEPENDENT NATION..." WHO WOULDN'T BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT SUCH A NUISANCE? SINCE BRITAIN'S DECISION, HOWEVER, WHICH THE DEPARTMENT NOTES "NOW APPEARS IRREVOCABLE" HAS BEEN CLEARLY QUITE FINAL FOR SOME TIME AS REPORTED IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES FROM THIS EMBASSY, THE LAST BEING MY TEL 1224, OCTOBER 26, 1972, IT SEEMS TO ME SOMEWHAT OF AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY TO "CONTINUE TO MAKE THIS POINT TO LONDON..."

(B) GAIRY AND OTHER GRENADIAN OFFICIALS (HOSTEN, KNIGHT, ET AL) AS WELL AS OTHER LEADERS IN THE ASSOCIATED STATES, ESPECIALLY ANTIGUA, UNDERSTAND, AND HAVE UNDERSTOOD FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS, OUR POLICY OF ASSISTANCE TO THEM THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ONLY. I HAVE REITERATED THIS POLICY PUBLICLY AND EXTENSIVELY AS EACH OF THE THREE U.S. TRANCHES WAS PASSED TO THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND ON EACH VISIT AND DISCUSSION WITH ISLAND LEADERS. WHEN I MET WITH GAIRY IN GRENADA IN OCTOBER 1972, WHILE HE WAS SPEAKING OF THE INDEPENDENCE TO COME IN LATE '73 OR EARLY '74, IN REPLY TO MY APPARENTLY NAIVE QUESTION AS TO HOW INDEPENDENCE WOULD BENEFIT GRENADA, GAIRY REPLIED THAT IT WOULD OPEN MANY ADDITIONAL CHANNELS OF ASSISTANCE. IN THE PRESENCE OF EMBOFF GEORGE MOOSE AND GOG MIN GEORGE HOSTEN, I STATED CATEGORICALLY TO GAIRY THAT HE WOULD BE MAKING A GRAVE ERROR TO THINK THAT THE U.S. ASSISTANCE POLICY WOULD CHANGE ON THE OCCASION OF GRENADA'S INDEPENDENCE.

THE PERSONAL LETTER WHICH I PREPARED FOR GAIRY LAST WEEK AND WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO HIM ON NOVEMBER 13 AGAIN PROVIDES BACKGROUND FOR HIM ON OUR MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE POLICIES, IN ADDITION TO INFORMING HIM ABOUT OUR POSITION ON DIPLOMATIC CONFIDENTIAL

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REPRESENTATION IN ST. GEORGE'S, AND OUR TENTATIVE PLANS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION (COPY OF LETTER BEING POUCHED SEPARATELY). GAIRY READ ENTIRE CONTENTS OF MY LETTER TO FULL CABINET MEETING IN PRESENCE OF EMBOFFS, NOVEMBER 13.

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT HE AND THE OTHER LEADERS OF GRENADA AS WELL AS THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER ASSOCIATED STATES ARE FULLY AWARE OF OUR POLICIES. THE

FACT IS, HOWEVER, THAT, MUCH IN THE SAME WAY THAT WE FIND OURSELVES RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT A FAIT ACCOMPLI ON THE PART OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN, THE ASSOCIATED STATES ARE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT U.S.G. ASSISTANCE POLICY TOWARD THEM. IN FACT, THEY FIND OUR POLICY UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM AND NOT NECESSARILY IRREVOCABLE. SINCE THE ABORTED REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, WHICH WAS TO HAVE HELPED THEM PREPARE PROPER PROJECTS FOR THE CDB, FOUNDERED THROUGH LACK OF SUPPORT BY ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE UK, US AND CANADA, THEY HAVE FOUND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH THE CDB TO THEIR SATISFACTION. IT IS ANOTHER FACT OF LIFE THAT, ALTHOUGH WE THINK, PROBABLY CORRECTLY, THAT THE CDB IS GREAT, THEY DO NOT. OUR ASSISTANCE POLICY TOWARD THEM (SEE REFTEL A) IS LIKE A SORE FESTERING UNDER THE SKIN, BECAUSE IT IS DIFFERENT (AND DISCRIMINATORY, THEY THINK) FROM OUR ASSISTANCE POLICY ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. SOME DAY, PERHAPS SOONER THAN LATER, THE SORE WILL BREAK OPEN.

(C) THERE IS NO REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MY VIEWS ABOUT OUR POLICY HERE AND THE DEPARTMENT'S, EXCEPT THAT I CONSIDER A SLIGHTLY BROADER ASSESSMENT OF OUR OWN INTERESTS TO BE A MORE REALISTIC ASSESSMENT THAN SOME IN THE DEPARTMENT OR AID APPARENTLY DO. IT IS A LITTLE DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE DEPARTMENT CAN CARRY OUT ITS INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN PARA 7 REFTEL C, "WE DO INTEND TO BE A HELPFUL GOOD NEIGHBOR TO GRENADA - - BUT WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF OUR OWN INTERESTS," WHEN THE ASSESSMENT SEEMS TO BE SUCH A NARROW ONE, AND HARDLY REALISTIC. I AM NOT TRYING SINGLE-HANDEDLY, AS SOME KIND OF EXERCISE IN MASOCHISM AND PAROCHIALISM, TO CHANGE USG ASSISTANCE POLICY HERE. IF I WERE, THE CASP IS THE PLACE TO DO IT, NOT A TELEGRAM ON GRENADA. WHAT I WAS RPT WAS ATTEMPTING TO CONVEY IN REFTEL A IS THE FACT THAT A TANGIBLE INDEPENDENCE GIFT TO GRENADA AND AN

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EXTENSION OF THE SDAF FUNDS TO GRENADA WOULD BE IN U.S. INTERESTS, WHILE OPERATING WITHIN A FLEXIBLE ASSISTANCE POLICY, GEARED TO REALITY AS IT CHANGES WITH THE SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. THAT'S ALL.

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ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00 CPR-02 AID-20 PRS-01

L-03 OMB-01 TRSE-00 IGA-02 DRC-01 /127 W

----- 066170

R 221425Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6393

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BRIDGETOWN 1607

E.O. 11652: GDS

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SUBJ: GRENADIAN INDEPENDENCE

FROM AMBASSADOR

2. GAIRY'S REACTION AND COMMENTARY TO LETTER FOLLOW:

(A) GAIRY SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND OUR RATIONALE FOR CHANNELING ASSISTANCE THROUGH REGIONAL CDB, PERMITTING MEMBER STATES TO ORGANIZE OWN ASSISTANCE WITHOUT DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, HE STRESSED DEPTH OF GRENADA'S NEEDS AND CALLED GRENADA INDEPENDENCE A "VERY SPECIAL EVENT" WHICH MIGHT WARRANT RECONSIDERATION OF ESTABLISHED POLICY. WITH GRACIOUS RELUCTANCE HE DECLARED HIS GRATITUDE FOR "DECORATIVE" INDEPENDENCE GIFT AND THEN PROCEEDED TO MAKE STRONG PITCH FOR ONE-TIME INDEPENDENCE GIFT THAT WOULD TRULY HELP GRENADIAN PEOPLE AND GRENADIAN-US FRIENDSHIP WHILE NOT SADDLING US WITH TROUBLESOME ONGOING AID PROGRAM. EX-PRESSING AMAZEMENT AT QUANTITY OF DIRECT US ASSISTANCE TO FAR OFF EA AND NEA COUNTRIES, GAIRY EMPHASIZED GRENADA'S NEEDS AS POOR COUNTRY AND CLOSE US NEIGHBOR. WHILE APPRECIATIVE OF THE "MEASURE OF HOPE" OFFERED IN OUR PROMISE TO CONSIDER

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USEFUL INDEPENDENCE GIFT, GAIRY AND OTHER CABINET MEMBERS SHOWED DISAPPOINTMENT OVER FACT THAT GIFTS PLEDGED BY OTHER, SMALLER STATES(E.G. ST. KITTS-NEVIS) MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN

WHAT WEALTHY US SEEMS PREPARED TO OFFER. GAIRY ALSO ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE DONATION OF SURPLUS US MILITARY EQUIPMENT, BUT EMBOFFS POINTED OUT THAT SUCH EQUIPMENT SOMETIMES IN POOR CONDITION AND WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE SUITABLE FOR GRENADA. GAIRY NEVERTHELESS INSISTED THAT IN THIS AND OTHER MATTERS THE US COULD FIND WAYS TO ASSIST GRENADA IF IT TRULY WANTS TO.

(B) INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATION. GAIRY EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR US EFFORTS TO PROVIDE USN SHIP AND HOPED THAT MILITARY CONTINGENT FROM SHIP COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN "INDEPENDENCE ACTIVITIES" (PRESUMABLY PARADE). GAIRY'S STAFF INFORMED US FORMAL INDEPENDENCE INVITATIONS SENT TO LONDON ON NOVEMBER 9 WHERE UK WILL HANDLE DISTRIBUTION.

(C) CONSULAR REPRESENTATION. GAIRY WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT HAPPY WITH DECISION AGAINST REPRESENTATION IN GRENADA AND HE EXPRESSED OPINION THAT ONE CONSULAR OFFICER WITH SMALL STAFF WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. WE REITERATED POSITION DESCRIBED REFTEL A (WHICH ALL OF US HERE AT EMBASSY WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT), AND TOLD GAIRY THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF OUR CHANGING THIS POLICY IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

3. IN EMBOFFS'S DISCUSSION WITH GAIRY AND HIS STAFF, WE GAINED IMPRESSION THAT INDEPENDENCE PLANNING HAS THUS FAR BEEN RATHER CURSORY AND INCOMPLETE IN MANY AREAS. POSSIBILITY CLEARLY EXISTS THAT CELEBRATIONS WILL BE MARKED BY CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION IN LOGISTICAL AREA. FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS, WE FEEL THAT SIZE OF US DELEGATION SHOULD BE HELD TO BARE MINIMUM OF NO MORE THAN FIVE, AND PREFERABLY FOUR, PEOPLE. ADDITIONALLY, POSSIBILITY OF FULL FLEDGED DISTURBANCE IS STILL WITH US (WE ARE IN PROCESS OF PREPARING SEPARATE POLITICAL/ECONOMIC ASSESSMENTS) AND WE AGAIN ASK DEPARTMENT TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF USING USN SHIP AS MEANS OF TRANSPORTING US DELEGATION BETWEEN BARBADOS AND GRENADA. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, PEARLS AIRPORT IS A LONG AND ARDUOUS DRIVE OVER POOR ROADS FROM ST. GEORGE'S AND IS OFTEN CLOSED BECAUSE OF WEATHER OR POOR RUNWAY CONDITIONS. RUNWAY ITSELF, NOW UNDER REPAIR, IS IN POOR CONDITION AND COULD CAUSE FURTHER

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DISRUPTION OF ALREADY UNEVEN LIAT FLIGHT SCHEDULES. FURTHERMORE, DEMONSTRATORS COULD EASILY BLOCK ROAD BETWEEN PEARLS AND ST. GEORGE'S AS WELL AS PEARLS RUNWAY ITSELF AS THEY DID LAST EASTER). SHOULD USN SHIP TRAVEL BE ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE WE SHOULD PLAN TO USE US AIRCRAFT (AS WAS DONE FOR BARBADOS INDEPENDENCE DELEGATION) SO THAT OUR DELEGATION IS NOT LEFT ENTIRELY TO VAGARIES OF LIAT'S UNDEPENDABLE AIR SERVICES TO AND FROM GRENADA.

4. I AM SINCERELY GRATEFUL FOR DEPARTMENT'S EFFORTS TO

EXPLORE SUPPLEMENTARY "TANGIBLE" INDEPENDENCE GIFT WHICH WOULD DO A GREAT DEAL FOR US IN GRENADA, NOT ONLY WITH REGARD TO GAIRY AND HIS GOVERNMENT, BUT TO THE AVERAGE GRENADIAN WHO CLOSELY WATCHES US AS HEMISPHERE'S MOST IMPORTANT NATION AND AS GRENADA'S NEIGHBOR. I CONSIDER IT OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT DEPT'S EXPLORATION OF THIS POSSIBILITY RESULT IN SPECIFIC FUNCTIONAL GIFT AS SUPPLEMENT TO DECORATIVE GIFT.

5. WITH REGARD TO SDAF, WE DOUBT THAT THE REASONS FOR THE DENIAL OF SUCH A PROPOSAL FOR THE BAHAMAS ARE, IN FACT, PERTINENT TO THE GRENADA SITUATION, SINCE GRENADA, BEING SO MUCH MORE UNDERDEVELOPED THAN THE BAHAMAS, COULD UNDOUBTEDLY PROFIT MORE FROM THIS SMALL ASSISTANCE THAN THE BAHAMAS. SDAF COULD BE ADMINISTERED FROM THIS EMBASSY AS THE PROGRAM FOR BARBADOS IS NOW. WE WOULD MUCH APPRECIATE THE DEPT'S CONTINUED EXPLORATION OF THIS POSSIBILITY. WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR ANOTHER SDAF - -, ONLY FOR OPPORTUNITY TO USE PRESENT REGIONAL SDAF ALLOCATION IN GRENADA AS WELL AS HERE. WE HOPE DEPARTMENT WILL BE ABLE TO CUT THROUGH EXISTING RED TAPE TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE. (IN MEETING WITH EMBOFFS GAIRY IDENTIFIED RENOVATION OF COMMUNITY CENTER IN NORTHERN PART OF ISLAND AS ONE PARTICULAR PROJECT WHICH COULD BENEFIT FROM US HELP - ABOUT US DOLS 5,000 - AND WHICH WOULD SEEM AN APPROPRIATE USE OF SDAF.)
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INDEPENDENCE, INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, INDEPENDENCE GIFTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973BRIDGE01607
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: BRIDGETOWN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731118/aaaaanas.tel
Line Count: 303
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) BRIDGETOWN 1426 (B) BRIDGETOWN 1, 425
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 JAN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15-Jan-2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <04-Feb-2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: GRENADIAN INDEPENDENCE
TAGS: PFOR, GJ, (GAIRY)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005